

MOVEMENT-COUNTERMOVEMENT DYNAMICS AND MOBILIZING THE ELECTORATE*

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Social movements draw attention to how their goals align with political candidates but also intensify tensions in local settings. These tensions can take the form of oppositional voter mobilization when the movement is perceived as a formidable threat. In this article, I argue that protest signals the potential for electoral victory, and that the mobilization of opposing voters results when countermovement organizations frame the potential for victory as threatening to voter's interests. I provide empirical support by examining Senate voting outcomes in the 2010 midterm election and show that increases in Democratic voting were most pronounced in counties with high Tea Party rally activity. In complementary analyses, I find that Independent voters are more likely to oppose the Tea Party in counties with higher rally activity, and this opposition increased their likelihood of voting for Democrats.

Elections are opportunities for social movements to shape the course of politics. By engaging in protest activity, movements signal the size of their constituency and the importance of their grievances to both politicians and the public. Yet, these signals sometimes incite opposition. To what extent does social movement mobilization contribute to electoral countermobilization? The impact of movement activity on elections has been the subject of recent academic debates (Blee and Currier 2006; Heany 2013; McAdam and Tarrow 2010), yet most studies focus on beneficiary political consequences such as voting (Andrews 1997; McVeigh, Myers, and Sikkink 2004), electoral realignment (McVeigh, Cunningham, and Farrell 2014), and further, preferred policy change (Amenta 2006; Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005), or policy implementation (Andrews 2004). I advance this body of work by examining the unintended consequence of mobilizing oppositional voting.

I argue that social movements mobilize voters through multiple mechanisms. Strong organizational infrastructures expose local residents to claims about the problems and solutions, linking movement goals with particular candidates (Andrews 1997, 2002). Protest, on the other hand, increases the visibility of the movement and the strength of its support, which can serve as countermobilizer—particularly when opponents interpret protest events as a signal of the movement's potential for political gains (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Taken together, social movement organizational infrastructure and protest have opposing effects during elections, prompting both supportive and oppositional voter mobilization. The view that organizational infrastructure matters for beneficiary outcomes accords with theories contending that organizations, leadership, and resources allow movements to employ multiple mechanisms for influence (Andrews 1997, 2004). These mechanisms of influence, however, are less understood. For students of social movements, the disruptive capacity of protest is critical for influence because it increases attention to the movement (Cress and Snow 2000; McAdam

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† I am grateful to Edwin Amenta, David Meyer, Rory McVeigh, Su Yang, Kraig Beyerlein, Bryant Crubaugh, Justin Van Ness, Melissa Warstadt, and the Social Movements/Social Justice Workshop at the University of California, Irvine for their thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this article and to Neal Caren and the four anonymous reviewers for their useful feedback. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2015 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association.

1982, 1983; Piven and Cloward 1977; Snow et al. 1998), its issues (Amenta 2006; McAdam and Su 2002), and can enlist the support of bystanders (Biggs and Andrews 2015). Protest has predictably negative effects under the condition that activities take shape as riots, include violence, or result in property damage (Davenport, Soule, and Armstrong 2011; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; McAdam and Su 2002). Although countermobilization is a potential unintended consequence of social movement activity (Andrews 2002; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996), research on the conditions under which nonviolent protest produces unanticipated or negative results is relatively scant (see Andrews 2002 for a notable exception).

In this article, I shed light on the unintended impact of nonviolent protest on the mobilization of opposing voters by investigating outcome of campaigns to mobilize the electorate during the 2010 midterm election. In particular, I examine the impact of Tea Party movement activity, and relatedly, activist countermovement organizations on Senate voting outcomes in U.S. counties. The midterm election was critical for Republicans seeking to stall or overturn President Obama's progress on healthcare, taxation, and economic inequality. Despite polls showing a demobilized Democratic electorate, why did some communities see gains in Democratic support? Importantly, to what extent did Tea Party movement mobilization contribute to electoral countermobilization? In particular, I examine whether conditions favorable to social movement emergence account for the influence of organizational infrastructure and protest on electoral backlash.

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Scholarly work in the area of social movement outcomes has traditionally investigated beneficiary political consequences. Many factors associated with social movement emergence, including political context (Amenta 2006; Meyer 2004), resources (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; McAdam 1982), organizational infrastructures (Andrews 2004), and coherent/resonant framing of grievances (Cress and Snow 2000), also increase the likelihood that a social movement achieves goals beneficial to its constituents. Importantly, this work typically employs an "action–reaction" model (Andrews 2004) that treats political officials or "the state" as the target of movement action. As Kenneth Andrews (2001, 2004) notes, movements with strong organizational infrastructures do better at securing political outcomes by forcing political officials to, out of fear of potential electoral threats, respond with concessions. In short, movements can achieve intended outcomes when they can wrest prerogatives from political officials (Amenta 2006). For example, recent work demonstrates that by using assertive action such as endorsing or fielding candidates, social movement organizations threaten elected officials' prospects for re-election (Amenta 2006; Amenta et al. 2012, 2017), which is why many politicians make promises to address activists' demands (Vasi, Strang, and Rijt 2014). In addition, protest affects policy change, albeit indirectly, by targeting political officials. For example, McAdam and Su (2002) find that anti-Vietnam War protest increased congressional attention to pro-peace legislation. In short, protests, especially nonviolent ones, typically have positive impacts on attention to movement issues (Amenta Gardner, Tierney, Yerena, and Elliott 2012; Andrews and Caren 2010) and agenda setting (Soule and King 2006).

Given the breadth of movement outcomes research on policy change, scholars have recently considered social movement impacts on voting behavior. Research to date has focused on the ability of movements to increase electoral mobilization for desired candidates (Andrews 1997, 2004; McVeigh, Myers, and Sikkink 2004) and increased alignment with political parties (McVeigh, Cunningham, and Farrell 2014). These works generally find that, regarding voting, movements generally have impacts in their desired direction.

More recently, however, scholars have called for more explicit focus on the unintended consequences of social movement activity (Amenta 2006; Amenta and Young 1999; Andrews 2014). Yet, much of this work remains state-centered. McAdam and Su (2002), for example, find that some types of protest can have negative consequences—particularly disruptive,

violent, or damaging protests slowed the pace of congressional attention to pro-peace issues, even if it increases the likelihood of pro-peace voting. Moreover, movements can do worse than fail (Amenta et al. 2010), as is the case when movement action results in state-sponsored repression (Davenport 2010, 2015; Moss 2014). Unlike the policy literature, however, largely ignored are unintended consequences on voting—how movement activity impacts oppositional voter mobilization.

EXPLANATIONS OF VOTER MOBILIZATION

Socioeconomic, political, and institutional factors all contribute to the mobilization of voters (Blais 2006; Cancela and Geys 2016; Geys 2006). Given my interest in Senate midterm elections in the U.S., and institutional factors (e.g., proportional representation, compulsory voting, concurrent elections, and the absence of registration requirements are presumed similar across subnational units), I focus instead on socioeconomic and political factors.¹

Socioeconomic Factors

Research in the political science tradition has identified numerous population characteristics important for increasing turnout. Research finds that population size and size of the minority population are important for increasing turnout at both the national and subnational levels (Cancela and Geys 2016; Geys 2006). Environments with smaller populations tend to have higher voter turnout. This finding is based on “calculus-of-voting” theories that treat voters as rational (Downs 1957) and argue that the probability of having a decisive victory is higher in places with smaller populations (Mueller 2003; Owen and Grofman 1984). That is, if a single voter can make a difference, voters will be less likely to sit out. Important for examining Democratic opposition to the Tea Party, populous and more densely populated areas tend to vote for Democrats (Dawson 1994; Tate 1993; Uggen and Manza 2002). We also know that the size of the minority population is related to turnout. Environments with higher minority populations experience lower turnout, given their history of disenfranchisement from the political system (Geys 2006; Keyssar 2000). However, contexts with higher minority populations exhibit stronger support for Democratic candidates.

Political Factors and Movement-Countermovement Dynamics

Political factors associated with voter mobilization center on the competitiveness of the election, which increases Democratic voter turnout. Close elections, for example, inspire turnout not only because voters perceive their vote as more decisive than it would otherwise be in an expected landslide (Mueller 2003), but also because close elections provoke increased get-out-the-vote efforts (Key 1957). While plausible, social movement activity also serves as a signal of the competitiveness of an election: protest publicizes the possibility of one side achieving political gains, which can have an independent influence on voter turnout for opponents. What is more, countermovement organizations in a community can further stoke voter countermobilization by framing oppositional voting as the appropriate response to the potential gains of the initial movement. Below, I clarify the claim that electoral countermobilization (by way of Democratic voter turnout) in the 2010 midterm election was part of a broader countermovement response to the Tea Party movement.

Empirical investigation of countermovements and countermobilization is relatively scant in social movement research. Meyer and Staggenborg (1996), however, propose several conditions under which countermovement mobilization emerges and declines. Opponents to a movement (or an issue) emerge and can mobilize support when they are able to “portray the conflict as one that entails larger value cleavages in society” (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1639). Moreover, potential victories for one side of the conflict spur activity for the other (Meyer

and Staggenborg 1996). Andrews (2002), for example, shows that growth in “white flight” institutions reflected backlash to the strides made by the 1960s civil rights movement. This backlash resulted, in part, from the capacity of existing anti-integrationist organizations to frame integrated schools as an attack on the Southern way of life, and suggest private white academies as the solution. In short, activity by a social movement can prompt opposition when it is perceived as formidable and legitimate enough to achieve its goals (Earl 2004; Koopmans 2004), and in particular, when opposing organizations can frame it as such. Scholars, however, tend to focus on sustained countermobilization through formal social movement organizations but have yet to adequately theorize the conditions under which social movement activity results in various forms of oppositional action, including voting in elections. Protests, for example, demonstrate a movement’s strength but can also contribute to opposition when this strength is perceived as a potential threat to existing social groups (Andrews 2002).

Should the mobilization of Democratic voters be treated as part of a broader social movement? Indeed, there are various individual-level reasons why people vote, and vote for Democrats in particular. Certainly, some residents pursued individual strategies for opposing the Tea Party, such as donating to progressive or liberal causes. However, a key form of resistance to the political aspirations of the Tea Party was through voting.

Democratic voter mobilization can be thought of as a countermovement strategy because there were links to a broader countermovement aimed at promoting a progressive agenda. Recent research shows that voter mobilization of the two major parties has waxed and waned over time (Green and Gerber 2015), which is reflected in how Democratic voter mobilization typically peaks in response to actual and potential Republican victories. Relatedly, countermovement resistance to movements also waxes and wanes, as can be seen with Citizen’s Council growth resulting from black mobilization (McMillen 1971). In a similar fashion, Democratic resistance may result from the threat of potential Tea Party movement successes. By engaging in visible forms of activity, the Tea Party demonstrated to voters its strength and potential to win in the midterms. As voters became increasingly exposed to the movement and its goals, so increased the likelihood of opposition and an electoral response to counter potential Tea Party wins.

However, not all voters observe movement activity (Downs 1957), and of those who do, many do not perceive it as something to support or oppose at the ballot box. For this reason, exposure is insufficient to explain voting outcomes. Importantly, organizations typically engage in “framing” activities that identify and elaborate the sources of and solutions to the problems they seek to address (Cress and Snow 2000). Framing is particularly important for mobilizing constituents to support a movement, and helping those constituents realize that voting for particular candidates is the solution to their problem. In this article, I expect that, to increase Democratic voter turnout, activist organizations framed (1) the midterm as a critical election, (2) Republican candidates (Tea Party-endorsed and otherwise) as dangerous, and proposed voting for Democratic candidates as the appropriate solution to halt potential electoral victories by the Tea Party.

In arguing that social movements generate change through multiple mechanisms, I advance the claim that protest increases visibility of the intensity of movement support but has unintended effects on voting, when countermovement organizations in the environment can suggest oppositional voting as the solution.

THE POLITICS OF THE 2010 MIDTERM ELECTION

The Tea Party Movement

The Tea Party movement emerged in early 2009, fueled in part by opposition to the election of President Barack Obama and fear that he would expand the size and reach of the federal government and would provide more bailouts, increase taxes, and restrict the free market. From the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Rick Santelli criticized President Obama’s proposed Homeowners Affordability and Stability Plan, and called for a “tea party in July.” Inspired by Santelli’s call to action, Tea Party organizations and rallies sprouted up across the

nation in preparation for a national Tax Day rally on April (Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin 2011; Zernike 2010a). The movement adhered to three principles: constitutionally limited government, lower taxes, and an unregulated free market (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

The movement's rapid emergence was the result of both top-down and bottom-up organizing, as well as substantial favorable news coverage (Fetner and King 2014; Lo 2012). Specifically, the Tea Party's growth resulted from funding from national conservative think tanks and wealthy benefactors such as Koch brothers, Americans for Prosperity, and FreedomWorks, and the movement's usage of the left-wing, grassroots style of organizing (Skocpol and Williamson 2012), as well as heightened media attention from conservative news outlets, especially the Fox News Channel (Boykoff and Laschever 2011; Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Williamson et al. 2011; Zernike 2010a). Despite national factions, the Tea Party was comprised of local, loosely tied, civic organizations that usually operated independently (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

Supporters of the movement typically identify with Republican Party (Parker and Barreto 2013; Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Zernike 2010a). They tend to be more economically well-off, religiously conservative, white, and highly educated, (McVeigh, Beyerlein, Vann, and Trivedi 2014; Skocpol and Williamson 2012). They express resentment toward minority groups (Parker and Barreto 2013), and tend to live in areas of low unemployment, high income inequality and racial segregation (McVeigh, Beyerlein, et al. 2014). Importantly, movement supporters believe they had done all the right things, earned their middle-class status, and seek to protect what is theirs (Zernike 2010a) from a government trying to subsidize those who Santelli called "losers" (CNBC 2009). Thus, support for the Tea Party is related to competing visions of who is deserving and undeserving of privilege (McVeigh, Beyerlein, et al. 2014).

In the run-up to the 2010 midterm election, Tea Party organizations prepared for electoral bouts at state and local levels. While some groups did not devote much time to electioneering, many were heavily engaged (Gardner 2010; Zernike 2010a). As one Tea Party activist stated, the goal for his organization was to "elect more Reagan conservatives in the midterm election," (Zernike 2010a: 79) and others argued that their long-term solution was to "install true conservatives in party office" (Zernike 2010a: 105). Many Tea Party groups held candidate forums (Zernike 2010a: 104) where they could meet and endorse candidates who sought, and were worthy of, the Tea Party label (Courser 2010; Miller and Walling 2012; Parker and Barreto 2013; Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Zernike 2010a). Additionally, national groups like Tea Party Express and FreedomWorks, who had previously "used their resources and know-how to help elect a number of candidates" (Gardner 2010: 1), sought to financially support candidates in the midterm. Altogether, Tea Party Express, FreedomWorks, and local groups had corresponding endorsements for thirty-three Republican Senate candidates. According to some analysts, the Tea Party was set to win enough electoral contests to exert lasting political influence (Gardner 2010; Zernike 2010b).

Alongside endorsing and fielding candidates, getting out the vote was imperative for the Tea Party movement, as exemplified by the \$1 million anonymous grant to the Tea Party Patriots to help local groups engage in election activities (Weigel 2010). Many Tea Party groups encouraged people to become politically active on their own (Gardner 2010). As one local leader instructed, "You can no longer be the one who doesn't vote. If you want to have an impact, you've got to show up" (Gardner 2010:2). Furthermore, some groups even recruited "precinct captains to get out the vote" (Zernike 2010a: 105). To help mobilize Republican voters, the Tea Party Express held a three-week cross-country "Just Vote Them Out!" tour that coupled voter registration efforts with Tea Party rallies (Gardner 2010).

Resistance to the Tea Party

Some have argued that the Tea Party represented a remaking of Republicanism (Newport 2010; Skocpol and Williamson 2012) and fears about a new, more radical Republican Party

may have contributed to growing resistance. While the Tea Party movement used rallies to get public attention to their issues, and more broadly to drum up widespread Conservative support for Republicans facing electoral bouts in the upcoming midterm, these actions may have had an independent influence on Democratic opposition. Indeed, the Tea Party received a considerable amount of favorable media coverage, which may have turned off many voters (Boykoff and Laschever 2011). Yet, since much of this appeared in conservative outlets (Boykoff and Laschever 2011; Skocpol and Williamson 2012), its effect on Democratic voting may be confined to right-leaning voters. Importantly, what role did prior activist countermovement organizations have in facilitating Democratic voter turnout? While some activist organizations, like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), attempted to get-out-the-vote during the midterm election, the character of that action has been largely overlooked.

Journalistic accounts of the 2010 midterm election cycle highlight a brewing Democratic resistance to the Tea Party. As one Democratic strategist put it, “The president’s been out there pushing these real solid policies: health care, jobs, stimulus, education reform. Those of us who consider ourselves to be his allies haven’t been doing our part in being out there and pushing hard enough against his opponents” (Corley 2010: 1). Moreover, in the summer of 2010, the NAACP approved a resolution that condemned the Tea Party for harboring racists and bigots (Corley 2010). NAACP’s president, Benjamin Jealous, viewed the resolution as a way to show that the “majority of this nation was ready, willing and able to fight back” (Corley 2010: 1). When asked about the strategy of various organizations painting the Tea Party as a racist organization, former U.S. Commission on Civil Rights chairperson, Mary Frances Berry, stated the following:

Tainting the Tea Party movement with the charge of racism is proving to be an effective strategy for Democrats. There is no evidence that Tea Party adherents are any more racist than other Republicans . . . but getting them to spend their time purging their ranks and having candidates distance themselves should help Democrats win in November. Having one’s opponent rebut charges of racism is far better than discussing joblessness (Almasi 2010).

Condemnation by the NAACP and other organizations wasn’t simply the result of growing animosity toward the Tea Party’s acceptance of racist affiliates, it was also part of a broader strategy to “motivate potential voters to come out and vote in November” (Corley 2010: 1). Activist organizations also responded to a number of violent incidents incited by Tea Partiers at rallies. For example, the Progressive Change Campaign Committee PAC (2010) posted an online video of a progressive activist being attacked by Tea Party supporters at a Rand Paul rally, which was accompanied by a petition to get Rand Paul to denounce Tea Party violence. Publicized the eve of the midterm, this video and the petition encouraged progressive voters to stand up against the Tea Party at the ballot. These events highlight activist organizations’ influence on public discourse about the changing character of Republicanism: that the Tea Party is racist and violent, the Tea Party and Republicans are the same, and expect Republicans to be as racist and violent—which necessitated response from Republicans. Some analysts suggested that the Tea Party “encouraged the sort of anger that boils over into such foul insults . . .” which spreads to the Republican Party (Costello 2010). Thus, while Republican Party leaders enjoyed the reinvigoration of Conservatism, they also had to deal with the Tea Party’s controversies.

Radical characterizations of the Tea Party may have contributed to intraparty opposition by alienating Republican candidates and voters from the Republican Party. For example, Charlie Crist, who grew disaffected by the party, chose to run as an Independent. Independent voters were also turned off from the Tea Party. In fact, a September 2010 CBS/New York Times poll showed an increase in opposition, with thirty percent of Independents holding an unfavorable view of the Tea Party movement (Zeleny and Thee-Brenan 2010). Taken together, these accounts demonstrate a coordinated effort by activist organizations to impede potential Tea Party electoral success by (1) increasing Democratic voter turnout and (2) encouraging Independents and Republicans to vote against the Tea Party-infused Republican Party.

DATA AND METHODS

Given my interest in the consequences of Tea Party movement activity and countermovement mobilization for the 2010 midterm election, I include data for an analytical sample of U.S. counties in thirty-five states that had a candidate running for the U.S. Senate in 2010.² I constrain my analysis to the 2010 election because the Tea Party's activity was targeted toward impacting local and statewide politics in the short-term, and by 2012, many locales that once had strong Tea Party presence no longer exhibited Tea Party activity (Fetner and King 2014; Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

I use counties as the unit of analysis rather than states or districts for several reasons. First, many Tea Party chapters were organized at the county level (McVeigh, Beyerlein, et al. 2014; Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Second, counties provide comparative leverage because I can examine 2,116 cases across thirty-five states. Finally, a county level analysis allows me to account for heterogeneity in structural conditions within states. County level demographic variables come from the American Community Survey (ACS) 2005-2009, measured immediately prior to the Tea Party's emergence. Therefore, with the exception of religion data measured in 2000 and the voting data measured in 2010, all variables are measured in the late 2000s. Importantly, boundary changes in five Colorado counties between 2000 and 2010 create problems for analysis. I therefore aggregate data for those counties into one cluster for that state.³

This process leaves a total of 2,112 U.S. counties voting in the midterm election. Because the main dependent variable is a percentage—the total number of votes for the Democratic candidate as a percent of the total county population—I use ordinary least squares regression to estimate the models. It is also possible that there are unobserved state-level factors that could influence voting. To reduce the risk of biased estimates, I use fixed-effects models to hold these state-level effects constant, which is analytically similar to including a dichotomous variable for each state. The fixed-effects approach controls for all unobserved, time-invariant state level characteristics, such as characteristics of individual Senators or policies unique to each state.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is Democratic voter turnout for the Senate in 2010. Congressional Quarterly's America Votes provides U.S. Senate voting data, measured as the total number of votes for Democratic candidates, as a percentage of the total county population.⁴ I select the Senate over the House because Tea Party groups were organized at the county level. Research on the Tea Party focuses on the movement's impact on House elections (see Miller and Walling 2012 for a notable exception), yet yields conflicting results with some demonstrating little-to-no Tea Party impact and others showing substantial impact (Courser 2010; Madestam, Shoag, Veuger, and Yanagizawa-Drott 2013). Because House voting is more likely to involve candidates representing relatively politically homogeneous districts, the impact of the Tea Party on electoral outcomes is unclear. For example, Tea Party operatives may have felt comfortable fielding more radically right candidates in districts rather than a heterogeneous state. Because it is unclear whether a district would have supported a Republican candidate in the absence of Tea Party activity, a more appropriate test of influence would be to examine the movement's impact on state level politics. By instead using Senate voting measured at the county level, I can directly compare geographical units within a state that exhibit some degree of variation.

Tea Party Infrastructure and Activity

To capture Tea Party movement organizational infrastructure and activity, I use data from the Institute for Research and Education on Human Rights (2011). From IREHR, I include the number of Tea Party chapters in a county as a measure of Tea Party organizational infrastructure. The IREHR examined online directories of major national Tea Party faction websites

and provided an exhaustive list of local organizations that belonged to one of the following factions: ResistNet, Tea Party Nation, or the Tea Party Patriots (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). These data, collected between May 1 and May 5, 2010, were geo-coded to locate each chapter within a specific county and state. Given that the data were measured after the census data were collected and prior to the midterm elections, I can use these data to isolate the effects of local Tea Party organizational infrastructure on the midterm election.

Based on the original data, 1,963 U.S. counties (63.1 percent) did not have a Tea Party chapter, with a total of 2,812 chapters dispersed across 1,147 U.S. counties. After limiting the data to the analytical sample of thirty-five states, there were 2,035 chapters distributed across 816 of 2,112 counties. Variation in the Tea Party chapter measure rather large, with a mean of nearly one chapter, and with at least one county having up to thirty-nine chapters. To deal with skewness, the variable is log-transformed. Figure 1 presents the geographic distribution of Tea Party chapters. The figure suggests there is substantial clustering of Tea Party chapters prior to the 2010 midterm, with many in the West, including Arizona, California, and Western Oregon.

Figure 1. Tea Party Chapters in U.S. Counties, 2009 to 2010





Figure 2. Tea Party Rallies in U.S. Counties, 2009 to 2010



To measure protest activity—also from IREHR—I include the number of Tea Party rallies between February 27, 2009 and April 27, 2010. In October of 2010, IREHR culled directories of press accounts of Tea Party rallies, and geo-coded each event within a city and state. Based on these data, there were 582 rallies spanning 377 cities. Of these, 569 rallies were valid for analysis.⁵ To incorporate the rally data at the county level of analysis, I used the National Association of Counties to identify the county within which each rally occurred. Importantly, rallies in some cities spanned across county lines and were therefore coded as occurring in multiple counties. There were 640 rallies spanning 339 counties. After restricting the data to the analytical sample of thirty-five states, there are 447 rallies that span 243 counties.

Because protest events vary considerably in the number of attendees, scholars have recently called for protest research to incorporate more robust measures such as protest size rather than event counts (Biggs 2016). However, Biggs argues that measures of protest size should only be used when reported accurately and estimated consistently (2016: 24). Closer examination reveals that this is not the case for IREHR's protest data. IREHR states that, where the number of attendees was unverifiable, an event is coded as having "one" participant, which accounts for nearly twenty percent (19.24 percent) of all events. Moreover, the remaining cases are imprecise, with most events measured in "hundreds" of attendees. It is for these reasons that using event counts is preferable to using protest size measures. Tea Party rallies ranged between zero and eight rallies in a county, and exhibited substantial skew. As such, I take the natural log of the number of rallies plus one (see table 1 on the next page). As depicted in figure 2, to some extent, many of the Tea Party rallies were clustered in the West.

Prior Countermovement Infrastructure

Given that oppositional mobilization to the Tea Party movement (in the form of Democratic voter turnout) may result from the activity of prior countermovements, it is necessary to incorporate a measure of countermovement organizational infrastructure. I use data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (2008) as a measure of the number of nonprofit activist organizations in each county, registered with the Internal Revenue Service as "Civil Rights, Social Action, and Advocacy" (category R) according to the classification scheme of the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE).⁶ Because the variable is skewed, I take the natural log of the number of organizations plus one.

Control Variables

Since research on elections finds that prior electoral results are strong predictors of future returns, prior turnout is a critical control for assessing the effect of Tea Party organizational infrastructure (chapters) and activity (rallies) on 2010 midterm turnout. I include variables from Congressional Quarterly's *America Votes* to measure Democratic turnout, defined as the total number of votes (as a percentage of the total population) for the Democratic candidate vying for the same Senate seat in that state, in the prior election.⁷ In almost all cases, the prior election for that same seat (given the seat up for election in 2010) occurred in 2004.⁸ Importantly, because 2004 was a presidential election year, and turnout is higher in presidential elections than in midterm elections, findings that reflect increases in 2010 turnout would serve as conservative estimates of turnout, relative to findings using prior midterm turnout as a control.

Census data from 2000 are far removed from the Tea Party's emergence and likely inaccurate as controls. For this reason, I include demographic control measures from the American Community Survey (ACS) 2005-2009. It is likely that the number of Tea Party chapters and rallies were proportional to the size of the population. I therefore include a measure for the natural log of the population. I also include a measure of the natural log of population density to capture whether or not Tea Party variables are related urban versus rural differences in U.S. counties. Recent research finds that Tea Party supporters tend to be more financially well-off and more educated than nonsupporters (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). I therefore include

measures for median family income, the percent of homes that are owner-occupied, and the percentage of the population over twenty-five years of age with at least a bachelor's degree. Tea Party emergence and support are related to voters' fears about ethnic and racial minorities as well as economic concerns (McVeigh, Beyerlein, et al. 2014; Parker and Barreto 2013). Thus, I include a measure for the percent of African Americans and of Latinos in a county. Relatedly, the Tea Party's anger against bailouts stemmed from fear about deepening unemployment and fears that President Obama would reward jobs and wealth redistribution to those who were "undeserving" (Zernike 2010a). Therefore, I include a measure of the percentage of the population that is unemployed. Moreover, given that the Tea Party's agenda, more generally, is related to a view of inequality as fair and just (McVeigh, Beyerlein, et al. 2014), I include the ACS Gini coefficient as a measure of income inequality. Supporters of the Tea Party tend to be older than nonsupporters (Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Zernike 2010a). I therefore control for the county's median age. Finally, because many Tea Party supporters tend to be affiliated with the Religious Right (Skocpol and Williamson 2012), I include a measure of the percentage of the population affiliated with evangelical denominations, using data from the 2000 Association of Religion Data Archives. Table 1, below, shows descriptive statistics for the variables in the analysis.⁹

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables (N = 2,112)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Democratic Turnout, 2010	11.16	5.66	0.00	40.61
Tea Party Rallies (logged)	0.11	0.33	0.00	2.20
Tea Party Chapters (logged)	0.41	0.61	0.00	3.69
Activist Organizations (logged)	0.75	0.97	0.00	5.59
Democratic Turnout (Prior Senate Vote)	18.57	8.19	0.00	57.35
Total Population (logged)	10.36	1.42	6.32	16.10
Population Density (logged)	3.83	1.55	-1.44	10.78
Median Income (1000s)	52.99	12.00	23.11	117.19
Percent Homes Owner Occupied	72.96	7.28	21.56	89.76
Percent College	18.40	8.22	4.57	59.07
Percent African American	8.80	14.28	0.00	82.35
Percent Latino	5.54	8.54	0.00	79.87
Percent Unemployed	7.00	2.99	0.00	36.11
Income Inequality (Gini)	0.43	0.04	0.27	0.62
Median Age	39.38	4.76	21.70	59.00
Percent Evangelical	43.37	27.61	0.00	99.72

Results

Table 2 presents ordinary least squares (with state-level fixed effects) estimates of voter turnout for Democratic Senate candidates in the 2010 midterm election.¹⁰ The first column excludes measures of Tea Party rallies and chapters, the measure of activist countermovement organizations, and the measure of prior Democratic turnout in prior Senate election, leaving only control variables. Higher percentages of Democratic voter turnout are found in less-populated but more dense counties. In addition, counties with high percentages of four-year college graduates experience increases in Democratic turnout. Regarding race relations, we see that Democratic voter turnout was high in places with high percentages of African Americans, but lower percentages of Latinos. Moreover, high turnout is found in counties with high unemployment, high median age, and low Evangelical populations.

Table 2. Effects of Tea Party Activity on 2010 Midterm Democratic Turnout in U.S. Counties: OLS Regression Estimates with Controls for State-Level Effects

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Controls</i>	<i>Prior Turnout</i>	<i>Movement Measures</i>	<i>Countermovement Measures</i>
<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(4)</i>
Tea Party Rallies (logged)			0.540** (0.166)	0.461** (0.168)
Tea Party Chapters (logged)			-0.107 (0.123)	-0.143 (0.098)
Activist Organizations (logged)				0.202* (0.095)
Prior Democratic Turnout		0.569*** (0.049)	0.567*** (0.049)	0.566*** (0.012)
Total Population (logged)	-1.314*** (0.331)	-0.618** (0.200)	-0.656** (0.210)	-0.730*** (0.109)
Population Density (logged)	0.952** (0.330)	0.265 (0.226)	0.257 (0.223)	0.252** (0.095)
Median Family Income (1000s)	-0.036 (0.027)	-0.031 (0.018)	-0.031 (0.018)	-0.031*** (0.009)
Percent Homeowners	0.030 (0.030)	0.012 (0.021)	0.013 (0.020)	0.017 (0.010)
Percent College	0.213*** (0.038)	0.079* (0.031)	0.077* (0.031)	0.074*** (0.013)
Percent African American	0.190*** (0.022)	0.112*** (0.017)	0.110*** (0.017)	0.107*** (0.006)
Percent Latino	-0.060** (0.022)	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.008)
Percent Unemployed	0.115* (0.057)	-0.010 (0.035)	-0.006 (0.035)	-0.006 (0.021)
Income Inequality (Gini)	4.537 (3.549)	1.151 (2.515)	0.925 (2.541)	0.649 (1.730)
Median Age	0.168*** (0.045)	0.057 (0.032)	0.055 (0.032)	0.050*** (0.014)
Percent Evangelical	-0.033** (0.012)	0.002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	0.003 (0.003)
Observations	2,112	2,112	2,112	2,112
R ²	0.426	0.730	0.732	0.732

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Next, I introduce a measure of prior turnout to explain variation in current turnout. As can be seen in column 2 of table 2, prior turnout has a strong positive relationship with Democratic turnout in the 2010 midterm elections. In the presence of controls, a one-unit increase in prior turnout is related to a .57 percent increase in Democratic voter turnout. With the introduction of the turnout variable, the coefficient for population size and percent college graduates maintain their significance. The percent of African Americans in a county is still significantly related

to Democratic turnout, while the size of the Latino population is now unrelated to the turnout. The measures for unemployment, percent Evangelical, and median age fall to nonsignificance.

The third column of table 2 introduces the two movement measures: Tea Party rallies and Tea Party chapters. Increases in the logged number of Tea Party rallies are associated with increased Democratic turnout during the midterm election, while the Tea Party chapter measure is unrelated to turnout. Put another way, nonviolent county-level Tea Party activity prompts countermobilization in the form of Democratic voter mobilization. This finding is consistent with my argument that the visibility of protest signals strength of the movement, as well as their potential for success, which is perceived as a threat to the political goals of opposing voters and prompts mobilization of an oppositional voting bloc. While decreased in size, the remaining variables maintain their significance level and direction with Democratic turnout.

In the final model, I include the countermovement measure: activist organizations. Similar to the previous model, the Tea Party rallies measure is still significantly associated with increased Democratic turnout, independent of prior countermovement infrastructure in the county. The number of Tea Party chapters is still unrelated to Democratic voter mobilization. Importantly, the increases in the (logged) number of activist organizations are associated with increases in Democratic voter turnout. The prior countermovement infrastructure is important for mobilizing voters, which provides support for my argument that while the visibility of Tea Party rallies themselves constituted a threat to Democratic voters, that threat was realized through the coordinated action of activist organizations in their ability to frame turning out to vote for Democrats as the appropriate means of opposing the Tea Party. In addition, prior Democratic voter turnout is still significantly related to Democratic voter turnout in the 2010 midterm election. Among the controls, population size, percent with a college degree, and percent African American maintain their significance with Democratic turnout. In addition, median income, median age, and population density are now significant in the final model.

Individual-Level Opposition to the Tea Party and Support for Democrats

As I have argued, Democratic voter turnout in the 2010 midterm election was, in part, the result of framing activities engaged in by prior activist organizations. Of course, it may also be true that regardless of countermovement activity, some voters, particularly Republicans or Independents, were turned off by the Tea Party's remaking of the Republican Party. Moreover, voters' opposition to the Tea Party may have resulted in a higher likelihood of voting for Democrats over Republicans. Given that the influence of social movements on voting outcomes may depend on public opinion (Burstein 1998b, 1998a; Burstein and Linton 2002; Uba 2009), I complement the county-level analysis with individual-level public opinion data collected a few days prior to the 2010 midterm election.

A Gallup/USA Today Poll administered in October 2010 allows me to assess how Tea Party activity in states shapes both individuals' opposition to the Tea Party as well as their likelihood of turning out to vote for Democrats in the midterm.¹¹ These data also allow me to identify the influence of Tea Party rallies on individual-level Democratic voting. In particular, I am interested in whether or not Tea Party rallies increased Democratic voter turnout by (1) encouraging Democratic voters to turn out, or (2) alienating Independent or Republican voters from the Republican Party. Important for my purposes, respondents' state identifiers are included in the poll. I can thus appraise the extent to which opposition to the Tea Party is related to personal attributes such as partisanship, as well as the level of Tea Party activity in an individual's environment. Additionally, I can identify whether or not such opposition influenced individuals to vote for Democrats. The data set consists of a nationally representative sample of 2,240 adults. After removing individuals not in states that held a midterm election in 2010, I am left with a total of 1,608 individuals across thirty-five U.S. states.

For the first analysis, the dependent variable is self-identified opposition to the Tea Party. This is based on answers to the following question, "Do you consider yourself to be an op-

ponent of the Tea Party movement?" For the second analysis, I include this measure of opposition to explain an individual's likelihood of voting for Democrats in the midterm. This variable is based on an affirmative answer to the following question from the survey, "If the elections for Congress were being held today, which party's candidate would you vote for in your congressional district—The Democratic Party's candidate?" Political party affiliation is the primary independent variable of interest, measured as three mutually exclusive categories—Republican, Independent, and Democrat.¹² For comparative purposes, these categories are dummy-coded with Democrat as the reference category. Another dichotomous variable is whether or not the respondent has a college degree, coded as "1" if yes. Other control variables are religiosity (1 = attends religious services once per week) and marital status (1 = married). After evaluating the effect of these factors on Tea Party opposition, I include aggregated state-level measures used in the previous county-level analysis. To analyze these data, I employ multilevel logistic regression models.

Table 3 on the next page assesses the impact of individual and state-level characteristics on self-identified opposition to the Tea Party. Model 1 shows only individual-level characteristics. In this model, Republicans and Independents are significantly less likely than Democrats to oppose the Tea Party. In terms of odds, Republicans and Independents are less than ten percent as likely as Democrats to oppose the Tea party ($\exp[-4.537] = .01$ and $\exp[-2.292] = .10$, respectively). This model also shows that religiously devout individuals were less likely to oppose the Tea Party, while the college-educated and African-American individuals were more likely to express Tea Party opposition.

Model 2 incorporates state-level controls. The individual measures all maintain their relationships with the outcome. Republicans and Independents are still less likely than Democrats to oppose the Tea Party. Those with college degrees and those who were African American were more likely to oppose the Tea Party. In addition, religious individuals were less likely to oppose the Tea Party than those who were not religious. Finally, the inclusion of the state-level controls explains little variance in opposition to the Tea Party, which is confirmed by the variance for the random effects component at the state level, $\psi = 0$.

To assess if the Tea Party alienated Independent voters, column 3 includes an interaction term between Independent voters and the logged number of Tea Party rallies in a state. As we can see, the interaction term is significantly related to Tea Party opposition. The main effect for the independent variable indicates that Independents were significantly less likely than Democrats to oppose the Tea Party when the logged number of Tea Party rallies in a state is at its mean level. The interaction term indicates that this negative effect becomes weaker (more opposition) in states with a higher than average logged number of Tea Party rallies. Independents living in states with a higher logged number of Tea Party rallies were nearly twice as likely (86 percent more likely) than Democrats to oppose the Tea Party. This finding lends support to the claim that Independents were turned off by the Tea Party when exposed to their activity. Beyond this, all other variables maintain their relationship with the outcome.

In table 4, I introduce the next dependent variable: the likelihood of voting for Democrats in the midterm. The first column includes only individual-level measures. Here, opposition is a strong predictor of support for Democrats. Those who are opposed to the Tea Party are nearly forty times as likely as nonopposers to vote for Democrats. Similar to the above models, Republicans and Independents are less likely to vote for Democrats (relative to Democratic voters), as are married individuals.

The second column in table 4 includes state-level controls. The addition of state-level controls does not change previously significant predictors of Democratic voting. In fact, the coefficient for Tea Party opposition is strengthened. Moreover, those who are married and those who identify as Republican or Independent are still less likely to support Democrats. Of the control variables, only population size is associated with the outcome, such that individuals living in states with smaller populations were more likely to vote Democrat.

The final model in table 4 introduces an interaction between Independent voters and their opposition to the Tea Party. We see that Independents who were opposed to the Tea Party were

Table 3. Individual Opposition to the Tea Party: Multilevel Logistic Regression Estimates

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Individual Measures</i>	<i>State-Level Controls</i>	<i>State-Level Interaction</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Republican	-4.537*** (0.309)	-4.598*** (0.315)	-4.673*** (0.324)
Independent	-2.292*** (0.246)	-2.339*** (0.250)	-2.616*** (0.287)
College Degree	0.522* (0.203)	0.563** (0.208)	0.555** (0.209)
Religious	-0.889*** (0.232)	-0.871*** (0.239)	-0.883*** (0.240)
Married	-0.368 (0.209)	-0.368 (0.212)	-0.384 (0.214)
African American	0.944* (0.453)	1.023* (0.464)	0.992* (0.466)
Tea Party Rallies (logged)		0.211 (0.256)	-0.077 (0.304)
Tea Party Chapters (logged)		-0.385 (0.344)	-0.439 (0.340)
Activist Organizations (logged)		-0.236 (0.484)	-0.200 (0.481)
Total Population (logged)		0.133 (0.162)	0.128 (0.161)
Population Density (logged)		0.415 (0.465)	0.455 (0.454)
Median Income (1000s)		0.014 (0.054)	0.007 (0.053)
Percent Homes Owner Occupied		-0.019 (0.037)	-0.014 (0.037)
Percent College		-0.030 (0.077)	-0.021 (0.076)
Percent African American		-0.018 (0.022)	-0.017 (0.022)
Percent Latino		-0.012 (0.026)	-0.011 (0.025)
Percent Unemployed		0.018 (0.215)	0.021 (0.216)
Income Inequality (Gini)		-5.262 (14.767)	-7.553 (14.655)
Median Age		-0.119 (0.086)	-0.131 (0.086)
Percent Evangelical		-0.003 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.010)
Independent X Tea Party Rallies (logged)			0.621* (0.28)
Constant	2.29 (0.2)	7.139 (7.913)	8.520 (7.867)
ψ	0.0	0	0
Observations	82	826	826
Log Likelihood	-323.044	-316.065	-313.700
AIC	662.	676.130	673.400
BIC	699.	779.895	781.882

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Table 4. Voting for Democrats in the 2010 Midterms: Multilevel Logistic Regression Estimates

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Individual Measures</i>	<i>State-Level Controls</i>	<i>State-Level Interaction</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Opposition to Tea Party	3.632*** (0.361)	3.796*** (0.394)	2.834*** (0.565)
Republican	-5.614*** (0.574)	-5.812*** (0.616)	-5.790*** (0.587)
Independent	-3.064*** (0.424)	-3.219*** (0.454)	-4.128*** (0.637)
College Degree	0.241 (0.347)	0.296 (0.368)	0.366 (0.377)
Religious	0.240 (0.397)	0.426 (0.427)	0.414 (0.450)
Married	-0.921** (0.353)	-0.857* (0.367)	-0.960* (0.388)
African American	1.889 (0.981)	1.981 (1.033)	1.948 (1.020)
Tea Party Rallies (logged)		-0.329 (0.447)	-0.377 (0.455)
Tea Party Chapters (logged)		0.076 (0.607)	-0.075 (0.627)
Activist Organizations (logged)		-0.127 (0.890)	-0.008 (0.908)
Total Population (logged)		-0.524* (0.261)	-0.489 (0.255)
Population Density (logged)		0.810 (0.797)	0.755 (0.818)
Median Income (1000s)		0.027 (0.089)	0.023 (0.092)
Percent Homes Owner Occupied		-0.112 (0.064)	-0.121 (0.066)
Percent College		-0.0001 (0.135)	0.008 (0.139)
Percent African American		-0.030 (0.037)	-0.025 (0.039)
Percent Latino		0.063 (0.043)	0.063 (0.045)
Percent Unemployed		-0.290 (0.370)	-0.249 (0.373)
Income Inequality (Gini)		-10.377 (24.236)	-11.323 (24.784)
Median Age		0.151 (0.138)	0.161 (0.144)
Percent Evangelical		0.019 (0.016)	0.021 (0.017)
Independent X Opposition to Tea Party			1.695* (0.763)
Constant	1.081* (0.446)	8.881 (12.349)	9.590 (12.792)
ψ	0	0	0
Observations	764	764	764
Log Likelihood	-127.944	-121.428	-118.885
AIC	273.888	288.857	285.770
BIC	315.635	395.544	397.096

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

more likely to claim that they would likely vote for Democrats in the upcoming midterm. In addition, the measure of opposition is still the strongest predictor of support for Democrats. Finally, those who were married were less likely to support Democrats in the midterm.

CONCLUSION

The results of the preceding analyses confirm that counties with higher numbers of Tea Party rallies also experienced increases in voter turnout for Democratic Senate candidates in the 2010 midterm election. Rallies, as nonviolent and extrainstitutional forms of protest, transmitted the Tea Party's message to the public and also heightened the visibility of the movement's assertive political activity, which created a sense that the movement was a formidable and legitimate right-wing threat that had the potential to win. This threat translates to electoral countermobilization when countermovement organizations identify oppositional voting as the solution.

The current study addresses broad gaps in social movement theory by investigating the effects of movements and countermovements on political outcomes. First, given the long-standing tradition in social movement scholarship to investigate left-wing movements, this work follows a more recent line of inquiry devoted to understanding the consequences of right-wing social movements (Blee 2002; Cunningham 2013; McVeigh 2009). By focusing on cases like the Tea Party, this work provides more general insights into patterns of social movement outcomes across the political spectrum.

Second, this work contributes to the growing chorus of scholarship on the impact of social movements on voting and elections as political outcomes (Andrews 1997; Heany 2013; McVeigh et al. 2004). In particular, because research on the Tea Party movement has focused on explaining its mobilization, tactics, or impacts on voting for House of Representatives candidates, this research broadens the scope of scholarly study on the Tea Party movement by empirically investigating their political impacts on the Senate. Continuing along this line of inquiry will allow scholars of social movements and political sociology to make stronger theoretical claims about movement impacts in politics more generally.

Third, this investigation expands our understanding of movement-countermovement dynamics. Scholarship on countermobilization tends to focus on the building and emergence of oppositional social movement organizations (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Yet, as I have shown, countermobilization extends beyond organizations or protest, into political outcomes such as voting. Therefore, just as social movements can influence voter mobilization, countermovements can impact voter countermobilization. As important, this study also demonstrates the ways that social movements themselves impact countermobilization by way of threat.

To advance the study of countermobilization, future work should further explore the ways that extrainstitutional social movement activity around political issues impacts electoral countermobilization. For example, scholars might consider the role of disruptive or violent protest on electoral backlash. In addition, this work should also explore how social movement mobilization differs from conventional campaign-related activities, and how this difference shapes oppositional voting. Further, examining how movement-countermovement dynamics shape cultural outcomes can advance the study of countermobilization. For example, recent work on marijuana legalization shows that marijuana movement organizations shaped the contours of marijuana discourse as a strategy to mobilize voters against antimarijuana activists (Vann 2016).

In this article, I focused on social movement activity and implications on voting in local settings. Where movements remain an active facet of the political landscape, their activities allow voters to interrogate understandings of movement grievances, and the importance of getting out the vote in support of, and opposition to, movement issues.

APPENDIX: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR COUNTY LEVEL VARIABLES*

<i>Variable</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>16</i>
1. Democratic Turnout, 2010	1															
2. Tea Party Rallies (logged)	0.13	1														
3. Tea Party Chapters (logged)	0.1	0.43	1													
4. Activist Organizations (logged)	0.25	0.58	0.59	1												
5. Dem Turnout (prior Senate vote)	0.54	0.12	0.07	0.22	1											
6. Total Population (logged)	0.2	0.52	0.62	0.79	0.11	1										
7. Population Density (logged)	0.22	0.42	0.5	0.69	0.1	0.88	1									
8. Median Income (\$1000s)	0.18	0.29	0.33	0.46	0.26	0.48	0.4	1								
9. % Homes Owner Occupied	0.11	-0.27	-0.23	-0.42	-0.07	-0.33	-0.26	0.07	1							
10. Percent College	0.26	0.38	0.38	0.58	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.76	-0.28	1						
11. Percent African American	0.19	0.06	0.03	0.21	-0.01	0.13	0.21	-0.24	-0.29	-0.1	1					
12. Percent Latino	-0.04	0.18	0.25	0.23	-0.09	0.25	0.07	0.11	-0.3	0.13	-0.07	1				
13. Percent Unemployed	0.16	0	0.05	0.07	0.04	0.14	0.18	-0.4	-0.29	-0.28	0.4	0.06	1			
14. Income Inequality (Gini)	0.15	0.14	0.1	0.24	0.11	0.12	0.12	-0.26	-0.42	0.12	0.41	0.02	0.3	1		
15. Median Age	0.1	-0.19	-0.18	-0.29	0.16	-0.41	-0.39	-0.1	0.52	-0.2	-0.24	-0.28	-0.27	-0.09	1	
16. Percent Evangelical	-0.14	-0.15	-0.12	-0.21	-0.19	-0.12	0.03	-0.48	0	-0.41	0.36	-0.17	0.3	0.26	-0.08	1

Note: * N = 2,112

NOTES

- ¹ Given that many states did not attempt to implement voter registration requirements (e.g., voter identification laws) until after the 2010 election, the absence of institutional variables is unlikely to impact the overall findings.
- ² I exclude the District of Columbia because it is the nation’s capital, counties in Alaska due to data limitations, and counties in Massachusetts because voting occurred during a Special Election.
- ³ In Colorado, I created one Broomfield county cluster, a single observation made up of Adams, Boulder, Broomfield, Jefferson, and Weld counties that was used in the analysis. All data were aggregated while the Gini coefficient was weighted by population.
- ⁴ I use turnout as a percentage of the total county population, rather than number of Democratic voters because turnout numbers are dependent upon population size (Mueller 2003; Owen and Grofman 1984).
- ⁵ There were three cases that were listed in cities that do not exist: Effingham, Washington; Jacksonville, Tennessee; and Valdosta, California. In addition, ten rallies were excluded from analysis: one in Delaware, three in Alaska and six in Washington, D.C. These ten were excluded because of data availability and the unique status of the capital.
- ⁶ I use activist organizations, rather than data on get-out-the-vote campaigns, and expenditures due to data inconsistencies and unavailability. Tax-exempt organizations with at least \$5,000 in annual gross receipts are required to register with the IRS. These data include the total number of organizations that filed with the IRS within 24 months of December 2008.
- ⁷ I use data for the same Senate seat, rather than the most recent midterm election for consistency (because not all states that held a midterm election in 2010 that included a Senate candidate held a Senate candidate midterm in 2006). In addition, because there may be unique attributes about a specific seat (e.g., candidate characteristics) that would be missed by using data from the prior midterm election.
- ⁸ Delaware (data from 2008-special election in 2010 to replace the appointed Senator who replaced Joe Biden in 2008) and West Virginia (data from 2006) are exceptions
- ⁹ See the appendix for the correlation matrix for these variables.
- ¹⁰ Because the dependent variable is a percent, I converted the measure to a proportion and ran the models using the general linear model (binomial logit). The results presented here are similar to those in the general linear model, which had similar directions and sizes of the coefficients.
- ¹¹ The data were downloaded from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, study number 2010TR1028.
- ¹² Recent work demonstrates that Independent voters typically vote along party lines (Bump 2016; Keith, Magleby, Nelson, Orr, Westlye, and Wolfinger. 1992). Unfortunately, the Gallup/USA Today poll did not ask Independents about prior voting patterns. As a proxy measure, the survey did ask Independents whether or not they lean Democrat or lean Republican. Therefore, in separate models, I use these data to further distinguish between “true Independents” and others. As a check for robustness, these models are similar in coefficient size and direction to those shown here.

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